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Jônadas Techio
The everyday is what we cannot but aspire to, since it appears to us as lost
to us.
Stanley Cavell
I.
In the introduction to Pursuits of Happiness, Stanley Cavell portrays phi-
losophy as a search to ‘disquiet the foundations of our lives . . . on the basis
of no expert knowledge, of nothing closed to the ordinary human being’.1
Cavell further characterises this approach, which he associates principally
with (later) Wittgenstein, Emerson and Thoreau, as a commitment to ‘being
guided by one’s experience’, to ‘let the object or the work of your interest
teach you how to consider it’, and to ‘educate your experience sufficiently so
that it is worthy of trust’.2 By Cavell’s own admission, this understanding
of philosophy may as well be thought of as ‘an overcoming of philosophical
theory’.3
Given these commitments, it is perhaps unsurprising that Cavell, a con-
fessed cinephile, should become a pioneer among his peers in defending the
importance of including films in the philosophical canon. One central rea-
son for that is precisely film’s promise to enrich and educate our experience,
enhancing our response to human behaviour – on film ‘every human posture
and gesture, however glancing, has its poetry’4 – and extending ‘our first
fascination with objects, with their inner and fixed lives’.5 In other words,
the very aesthetic potentialities of film make it a well-suited candidate to en-
able the kind of concentrated reflection upon ordinary experience that Cavell’s
methodology prescribes, but which he thinks philosophy ‘has cause sometimes
to turn from prematurely, particularly in its forms since its professionalisa-
tion, or academisation’.6 Thus the radical claim that film shows philosophy
to be ‘the often invisible accompaniment’ of ordinary lives.7
In what follows I make a case for considering Yasujiro Ozu’s Late Spring
(Banshun, 1949) as an exemplar of film capable of displaying structural fea-
tures of ordinary experience that are otherwise easy to dismiss, and indeed
have been largely dismissed by professional philosophers, at least in the an-
alytical tradition – aspects having to do with the role of human intimacy,
social expectations, habitual practices and repetition in creating and sustain-
ing a world. Additionally, I argue that the film reveals the inherent fragility
of that achievement, especially when facing the challenges posed by (what
Cavell calls) modern skepticism.8 Finally, I suggest that Ozu’s film epito-
mises the work of mourning that is called for once our dwelling is disrupted.
Late Spring explores these issues by focusing on the complex transition from
a traditional (call it ‘Japanese’) to a modern (call it ‘Westernised’) way of
relating to the ordinary, emblematised as the domestic and the familiar – or
rather the familial, since at its center is a world-defining relationship between
a father and a daughter. As it happens with many of Ozu’s films, Late Spring
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employs a number of cinematic techniques in order to familiarise us with the
rhythms and the geography of the protagonists’ domestic world, as well as
with the specific way they ‘animate’ it – only to make us painfully aware of
its collapse when the daughter decides to leave the house.9 The collapse of
that domestic world reverberates through and is amplified by other aspects
of its narrative, such as its depiction of the gradual replacement of traditional
practices, technologies, and rituals in favour of more ‘modern’ counterparts.
At an even more general level, as its title attests, Late Spring is also a medi-
tation on the cyclical character of life, alternatingly framing the protagonists’
plight in personal and in cosmic perspectives, thus reminding the viewer of
the permanent human task of finding a balance between those stances.
I support these claims in what follows by connecting some fundamental
Cavellian (hence, as we will see, Thoreauvian and Wittgensteinian) insights
concerning modern skepticism and its threat to the ordinary with Ozu’s explo-
ration of the difficulties involving human relatedness and domesticity in Late
Spring. Accordingly, I start by delineating Cavell’s diagnosis of our modern
predicament (section II), then I look for expressions of that predicament in
representative sequences of Ozu’s film (section III). In both cases the notion
of mourning plays a central role. I close by establishing one additional parallel
between Cavell’s and Late Spring’s interpretations of the ordinary, focusing
on the absence of a wedding ceremony at the end of Ozu’s film (section IV).
II.
As intimated above, a central goal of Cavell’s work has been to elucidate the
dynamics of the relationship between our ordinary, pre-reflexive absorption in
the world and its disruption, caused by (what he will call) skepticism. That
relationship has presented itself in different guises throughout the history
of the West, but Cavell is especially interested in the forms it has taken
since modernity – say since the time of Galileo and Descartes – when our
pre-reflexive absorption came to look like (at best) a naïve or ungrounded
epistemic stance that should be subjected to the Tribunal of Reason, so that
the reliability of our inherited opinions and beliefs could be systematically
assessed with the aim of achieving certainty. It is precisely this obsession with
certainty that, according to Cavell, eventually led to the feeling of isolation
and loss of contact with external reality that he identifies as characteristic of
modernity. The following passage presents that diagnosis concisely:
In the unbroken tradition of epistemology since Descartes and
Locke . . . , the concept of knowledge (of the world) disengages
from its connections with matters of information and skill and
learning, and becomes fixed to the concept of certainty alone,
and in particular to a certainty provided by the (by my) senses.
At some early point in epistemological investigations, the world
normally present to us (the world in whose existence, as it is
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typically put, we ‘believe’) is brought into question and vanishes,
whereupon all connection with a world is found to hang upon
what can be said to be ‘present to the senses’; and that turns
out, shockingly, not to be the world. It is at this point that the
doubter finds himself cast into skepticism, turning the existence
of the external world into a problem.10
Crucially, for Cavell, the skeptical move leading to the ‘problem of the
external world’ is not to be construed as a kind of intellectual game designed
to satisfy purely theoretical demands;11 rather, it should be seen as a serious
(if ultimately misguided) response to real difficulties connected with the loss
of ‘the world normally present to us.’12
The history of how the world’s ‘presentness’ to us became threatened with
modernity is, of course, a long and complex one. Were it to be spelled out, it
should emphasise a series of interconnected and mutually reinforcing factors
such as (but in no way limited to) the following: (a) the Protestant Reforma-
tion, and with it (b) the decline in centralised religious authority, which in
turn was instrumental for (c) (what Nietzsche called) ‘the death of God’, as
well as for (d) the destitution of the absolute political power of (theocratic)
monarchies; concurrently (e) the rise of the new science, and with it (f) mech-
anistic models of explanation that, when applied to perception, led to (g) the
positing of a gap between ‘primary’ (objective) and ‘secondary’ (subjective)
qualities of the world which, when radicalised, came to look like (h) an abyss
separating ‘inner’ and ‘outer’. Top this out with (i) the radical criticism of
(West-European) beliefs, practices, and institutions fomented by the Enlight-
enment and, simultaneously, with (h) ‘the age of global exploration,’ enabling
contact with new cultures, mores, and worldviews, and you are off to a good
start. Suffice it to say that changes like these gradually undermined our re-
liance on any kind of absolute or transcendent values, creating an existential
vacuum that we are still striving to fill in one way or another; as Cavell dra-
matically summarises it, the central issue suggested by this kind of skepticism
is ‘how to live at all in a groundless world’.13
It is precisely this existential motivation of modern skepticism that, ac-
cording to Cavell, makes it so hard to overcome – notwithstanding the count-
less attempts at refuting the arguments employed by skeptics, starting already
with Descartes’s. Moreover, blindness to this dimension ends up driving philo-
sophical criticism to inadvertently assume the terms of the problematic view it
wants to avoid, ceding the very conception of human experience that grounds
the skeptic’s self-interpretation. Finally, and more importantly, by disregard-
ing the real concerns underlying skepticism one fails to learn what it has
to teach about our finitude – what Cavell sometimes calls the ‘fundamental
insight’, the ‘moral’ or even the ‘truth’ of skepticism.14 Hence the pecu-
liar difficulty faced by someone simultaneously interested in being faithful to
skepticism’s deep lessons while avoiding its own misguided self-understanding.
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This difficulty is vividly brought to the fore in the following passage, in which
Cavell tackles Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s exemplary responses to skepticism:
. . . Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s return to ordinary or everyday
language is, before anything else, a formidable attack on skepti-
cism, epitomised by the difficult thought that it is not quite right
to say that we believe the world exists (though certainly we should
not conclude that we do not believe this, that we fail to believe
its existence), and wrong even to say we know it exists (while of
course it is equally wrong to say we fail to know this). And if one
convinces oneself of the truth of such observations, it is then at
issue, and much harder, to determine what it is right to say here,
what truly expresses our convictions in our relation to the world.
The idea is less to defend our ordinary beliefs than to wean us
from expressing our thoughts in ways that do not genuinely sat-
isfy us, to stop forcing ourselves to say things that we cannot fully
mean. What the ordinary language philosopher is sensing – but I
mean to speak just for myself here – is that our natural relation
to the world’s existence is – as I sometimes wish to express it –
closer, or more intimate, than the ideas of believing and knowing
are made to convey.15
The central question I want to address in the remainder of this section
is precisely how to express our convictions in our ordinary relation to the
world while taking to heart the valuable skeptical lessons about our finitude,
yet without assuming skeptically infused notions of ‘belief’, ‘knowledge’, ‘cer-
tainty’, ‘(external) world’, and so forth.
Besides looking for inspiration in Austin and Wittgenstein to develop such
a ‘difficult thought’, Cavell identifies a congenial response to skepticism in
Thoreau’s writings, particularly in the idea of ‘mourning’, understood as ‘the
path of accepting the loss of the world’, accepting it ‘as something which ex-
ists for us only in its loss’.16 This means accepting the fact, so crucial to our
modern sensibility, that the world’s existence is indeed separate from our own
while avoiding to construe this as an epistemic ‘problem’ in need of a theoret-
ical ‘solution’ (a bridge over this gap). Once we realise that every impulse to
philosophy has the power to break our original absorption in the world, there
is no return to a kind of prelapsarian state; rather, the only way to reconnect
with the world will be precisely by accepting that it is always already reced-
ing, which implies a willingness for a constant acknowledging of separation,
of loss – something that, as Cavell remarks, ‘may be the achievement of a
lifetime.’17
This is indeed a difficult thought, which is also crucial to understand
Cavell’s engagement with skepticism, so it bears elucidation. As I learned
from Tammy Clewell, a useful way to go forward in this connection is to
distinguish the Thoreauvian notion of mourning from its Freudian construal,
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as presented, e.g., in the essay ‘Mourning and Melancholia’.18 In that work,
Freud defines mourning as a painful process of reinvestment of libido going
from the original lost object – a loved one, say – to some kind of consoling
substitute – a person, a thing, an activity, and so on. As Clewell clarifies,
Thoreauvian mourning differs from this Freudian process in that it ‘neither
seeks to recover what has been lost nor attempts to install a substitute in
place of the absence’.19 By thus avoiding or bypassing the process of libido
reinvestment, and confronting the full reality of her loss, the Thoreauvian
mourner will engage in a (potentially endless) activity of seeking a renewed
self-identity that is constantly informed by the irrecoverable and irreplaceable
loss of the loved object.20
An additional step towards understanding the role of mourning in Cavell’s
assessment of skepticism is to project it onto the social or collective circum-
stances laid bare by modernity – the ‘existential vacuum’ I was alluding to
earlier, created by the loss of absolute foundations for meaning and value. In
Clewell’s words, what we have lost is ‘a sense of immediacy or necessity gov-
erning our social forms of life’, showing that ‘nothing preordained or essential
determines the structures of our society’; she continues:
In Cavell’s account, this knowledge of social contingency cannot
be grasped without an experience of self-division and laceration.
We must be thrown out, so to speak, of our habitual dwelling
places – our selves, traditions, beliefs, and languages – so that they
appear not as transcendentally sanctioned and unalterable social
forms, but ones of human creation for which we are responsible.21
This passage perspicuously conveys what in Cavell’s view is skepticism’s
fundamental contribution towards a better-informed understanding of our
condition, namely the discovery of our ultimate ungroundedness, our always
imminent Unheimlichkeit. Only through that realisation will we be able to
acknowledge our own responsibility in enabling and sustaining (not only lin-
guistic but also personal and social) meaning, in making ourselves at home
in the world.
However – and here we are back to the ‘difficult thought’ alluded to above
– granted that modern skepticism was largely responsible for laying bare that
aspect of our condition, the problem is that the skeptic herself is not fully
prepared to take that existential revelation to heart, reacting instead by inter-
preting ‘a metaphysical finitude as an intellectual lack’, that is, transforming
it into a ‘riddle’ in search of a (theoretical) solution.22 The skeptic thus
falls short of acknowledging the loss of the world, and this, as Wittgenstein
would put, is more a problem of the will than a problem of the intellect:23
what makes it so hard to accept this separateness is not (as the skeptic tends
to think) its epistemic costs, but rather the existential costs of thwarting
our deep-seated desire ‘to know the world as we imagine God knows it’,
which is ultimately a desire for absolute control over it – ‘a yearning at once
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unappeasable and unsatisfiable, as for an impossible exclusiveness or com-
pleteness’.24 As Daniele Rugo clarifies, it is precisely this fantasy of ‘total
penetration’ that opposes a (Thoreauvian, Wittgensteinian and Cavellian)
acknowledgment of our constant responsibility in establishing meaning.25 On
this view, the skeptical doubt is a displacement of our discovery of separate-
ness, and it is grounded upon a fantasy that is self-defeating, since without
(separate) relata there would be no relation to begin with.26
With this idea of doubt as a displacement of the discovery of separate-
ness, my reconstruction of Cavell’s diagnosis of modern skepticism is almost
finished. For ease of presentation, I summarise its main outcomes as follows:
(i) modern skepticism is born not simply from intellectual overzealousness
regarding the conditions for attaining knowledge, but from the desire to re-
cover our lost absorption in the world; (ii) but this desire and the fantasy of
absolute intimacy that accompanies it are self-defeating, in that there is no
(real) relationship without separateness – any (real) relation requires at least
two relata; (iii) skeptical disappointment with the world’s separateness is,
therefore, disappointment with a real aspect of our condition; however, (iv)
the skeptic tends to ‘cover up’ that realisation, intellectualising it, transform-
ing it into an epistemic problem (a quest for certainty); (v) mourning the loss
of that (fantasised) intimacy is, therefore, a necessary step towards a more
mature, undisplaced acknowledgment of our finitude, which, in turn, would
hopefully lead us to (vi) take fuller responsibility for building and nurturing
real relationships, realising that no tradition, no set of social norms, nor any
other ‘transcendent’ factor can enable and sustain meaning and significance
as it were impersonally, without exposing us to the risks of trying to make
ourselves at home in the world.27
I want to add one final Cavellian insight to this list before transitioning to
Late Spring. Consonant with the view just summarised, Cavell has argued on
many occasions that modern skepticism is a philosophical interpretation of
something that is also known by the arts, and that is exemplarily examined in
the forms of comedy, melodrama, and tragedy. For example, in the following
passage Cavell defines ‘the thing known in melodrama and in tragedy’ as,
‘roughly’:
the dependence of the human self on society for its definition, but
at the same time its transcendence of that definition, its infinite
insecurity in maintaining its existence. Which seems to mean, on
this description, in determining and maintaining what ‘belongs’
to it.28
In the same vein, but referring specifically to Hollywood comedies and
melodramas of the 1930’s and 40’s, Cavell puts this point by claiming that
the best of them are ‘working out the problematic of self-reliance and confor-
mity, of hope and despair’.29 In these instances relations between individual
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human beings – particularly between the couples at the center of their narra-
tives – are exemplary of the possibilities of society: comedies are concerned
with the acceptance of separateness that is required to achieve equality be-
tween human beings in the form of (re)marriage, while melodramas present
us the flip side of this, namely the failure (on the man’s part, as it happens)
to accept separateness, thus leading one (a woman, as it happens) to look
for an alternative way of expressing individuality and self-reliance, without
conforming to society’s present expectations. In both cases, Cavell argues,
the challenges involved in the institution of marriage serve as emblems of the
challenges involving human relatedness as such – both to others and to the
world. And:
[if] some image of human intimacy, call it marriage or domes-
tication, is the fictional equivalent of what the philosophers of
ordinary language understand as the ordinary[...], then it stands
to reason that the threat to the ordinary that philosophy names
skepticism should show up in fiction’s favorite threats to forms of
marriage, namely in forms of melodrama and of tragedy.30
With this last Cavellian insight in place – call it (vii) the fictional equiva-
lence between the ordinary and the domestic, on the one hand, and between
skepticism and the threat to domesticity, on the other – I hopefully have all
the elements I need to put forward a reading of Late Spring as a study in
mourning the loss of the ordinary in the face of skepticism.
III.
Cavell once claimed that ‘any relationship of absorbing importance will form
a world’.31 The flipside is that profound changes in any relationship of absorb-
ing importance will destroy a world. Referring to Ozu’s filmography, Tyler
Parks notes ‘the importance of the observation and evocation of change in
the director’s work’:
Change [in Ozu’s work] may be understood in this regard as per-
sonal, social, or cosmic: as a transformation that characters and
their relationships undergo, as the giving way of traditional norms
and adoption of new modes of living, or as an ephemerality that
characterises all existence, human or otherwise.32
As with many of Ozu’s films, Late Spring is obsessed with human rela-
tionships and domesticity – hence, in Cavell’s sense, with the ordinary. As
with the comedies and melodramas that Cavell singles out for analysis in his
work, Late Spring examines the ordinary by focusing on one concrete, em-
blematic human relationship, exploring the trials and changes it has to face
in order to allow the individuals involved in it to continue in their pursuit
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of happiness.33 The change that is most ostensible in Late Spring affects the
domestic world created by the ‘relationship of absorbing importance’ between
a widowed father, Shukichi Somiya (Chishu Ryu), and his single, 27-year-old
daughter Noriko (Setsuko Hara). For Noriko in particular, this change is ex-
perienced as a somewhat belated transition from the world of childhood to
the world of adulthood, symbolised by marriage; for Somiya, the change is
from a shared, familial world of mutual dependence to one of separateness
and solitude at his old age. At a more general level, however (and in syntony
with Parks’ suggestion above), the film is also preoccupied with the destruc-
tion of a whole ‘mode of living’ that, for lack of a better shorthand, I will
keep calling ‘Japanese’ (in contrast to ‘Westernised’).
I support these claims below by describing a series of representative se-
quences from Late Spring in which the connections between the protagonist’s
personal plight and the broader changes occurring in their world are espe-
cially tangible. Space limitations require selectivity and conciseness, yet I
hope the cumulative effect of these descriptions will suffice to lay bare the
film’s underlying concern with a multi-layered destruction of modes of living,
and with the work of mourning that is called for by the losses it effects.34
(i) Noriko’s introduction
After a couple of opening shots establishing the setting for most of the film –
a sign in the train station identifies the city of Kamakura, in Japan – we are
introduced to the first of our two protagonists, Noriko, as she joins a group
of older women inside a house.35 The entire mise-en-scène of this sequence,
starting with the room’s layout and decoration, provides plenty of visual hints
intimating that the women are preparing for a traditional Japanese tea cer-
emony: their gestures are, for the most part, studied, ritualised and solemn;
they are all dressed in kimonos, sitting on tatami mats in the mandatory
seiza position, around what I assume is a Furo.36 But a couple of small
details seem out of place. The first is the purse that Noriko brings as she
enters the room; soon after greeting the women she becomes self-conscious,
as if sensing that such a modern item does not fit the traditional setting.
Interestingly, however, no one else seems to care, or even to register the fact.
Furthermore, as Noriko sits next to her aunt Misa (Haruko Sugimura) they
immediately engage in lively conversation, thus defeating our initial impres-
sion of the occasion’s solemnity. These, as we will see, are only the first of
many subtle indications in this film of a world in transition, in which tradi-
tions and practices are being gradually undermined, becoming more nostalgic
or evocative than fully alive.37 Additionally, the sequence also starts estab-
lishing Noriko’s character itself as ambiguous or transitional, something that
will be reinforced throughout the movie (at one point, for example, her aunt
will describe her as ‘old fashioned for someone her age’), thus allowing her
to emblematise the growing split between the old Japanese customs and the
new, westernised ones.
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Noriko’s introduction 2
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Noriko’s introduction 3
(ii) Somiya’s introduction
The next sequence continues on this note. In it, we are introduced to our
second protagonist, Noriko’s father, Professor Somiya. We see him at home,
sitting next to his assistant Hattori (Jun Usami), as both are working on some
kind of scholarly paper. Again, what is striking about this sequence are the
small incongruences: both characters are sitting on a tatami, inside a tradi-
tional Japanese house, surrounded by Japanese furniture (in particular, the
chabudai, or short-legged table they use to work), but while Somiya is wearing
a kimono Hattori wears a (Western-style) suit. Furthermore, the topic of their
research comes clearly from a Western academic context – they are writing
about the German-American economist Friedrich List, about whom Somya
seems to know a great deal (for example, that he should not be confused
with Franz Liszt, the Hungarian composer). This short sequence, therefore,
not only gives us a clear indication of Somiya’s familiarity with Western cul-
ture but also contributes to sediment the impression of its entrenchment in
Japanese society.38
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Somiya’s introduction
(iii) Aya’s introduction
Another important character, in addition to the two protagonists, is Nori-
ko’s friend Aya (Yumeji Tsukioka). More than anyone else in the film, Aya
embodies the nascent, westernised way of life. This is directly displayed by
her way of dressing and behaving, and especially by her status as a young
divorcee (a very recent possibility in Japan, introduced by the new Consti-
tution of 1948).39 The first time we see her is when she visits Noriko at the
Somiya house. Ozu here is again magistral in providing all sort of visual clues
underscoring the differences between Aya’s ‘modernity’ and Somiya’s ‘Japane-
seness’, with Noriko characteristically falling somewhere in between the two.
As Aya arrives she learns from Somiya that Noriko will be home soon; Somiya
then invites her to sit down with him (on tatami mats, as it happens); upon
Noriko’s return, having spent no more than a couple of minutes sitting on
the tatami, Aya gets up complaining that her legs ‘fell asleep’ – a first, not so
subtle indication of her unfamiliarity with ‘old’ Japanese customs. The two
women then move to a room upstairs which we will soon learn to identify as
Noriko’s favourite refuge. Contrasting with the lower, ‘Japanese’ floor, the
furniture upstairs is more modern and westernised. They sit on chairs around
a coffee table to have tea. As if to reinforce the message conveyed by this
moment, it is Somiya (the representative of traditional Japan in this context)
who brings them tea, but he forgets the sugar and the teaspoons, causing the
two to giggle, implicitly making fun of his ‘backwardness’. Moreover, their
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Aya’s introduction 2
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ensuing conversation (the main topic of which is marriage and divorce) em-
ploys many metaphors coming from Baseball, a Westernised sport that was
becoming increasingly popular in Japan at that time. (This message is again
reinforced by the sequence that immediately follows their conversation, in
which we see children – the new Japan – playing Baseball.)
(iv) Noriko and Somiya’s domestic world
Throughout the first half of the film, we follow Noriko and Somiya in several
daily routines and intimate family moments, especially inside their house.
These moments gradually settle our impression of Noriko’s resourcefulness,
her joy in feeling helpful, as well as Somiya’s dependence on her – Noriko is
in charge of preparing and serving dinner, making tea, organising the house,
and so on. Andrew Klevan offers a sharp description of the dynamics of these
interactions:
Noriko’s movements around the house show the freedom she cre-
ates for herself while living with her father. Although she appears
to be trapped in a form of servitude – tidying up after him, hang-
ing up his clothes making the dinner – she is also ‘running rings’
around him.40
Getting acquainted with these family routines makes us realise the full
extent to which this ‘relationship of absorbing importance’ (to go back to
Cavell’s phrase) has been successful in establishing a shared domestic world.
This realisation, in turn, will be crucial for helping us understand the full
extent of the changes affecting this arrangement during the second half of the
film.
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Noriko and Somiya’s domestic world 2
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(v) The Noh play
Said changes begin to emerge more clearly during a pivotal sequence in which
Somiya and Noriko attend a traditional Noh play. The play itself is charac-
terised by very precise, ritualised movements that are used by the actors
to express deep emotions with minimal expressive behaviour (a description
that, incidentally, is also apt for the performances in Late Spring).41 Given
the traditional setting, our expectation is that the protagonists will assume a
respectful attitude, directing their full attention to the play. Although that
expectation is initially met, we soon detect some disturbances (similarly to
what happened in sequences [i] and [ii]). In this case, they are triggered by
the presence of another character, the widowed Mrs. Miwa (Kuniko Miyake),
about whom Noriko knows at this point that she is a suitor to (re)marry
Somiya.42 Again, the interactions among these three characters are minimal
in terms of overt expression, but they are able to convey intense (if deeply
buried) emotion. Case in point, a subtle lowering of the head by Noriko upon
acknowledging Mrs. Miwa’s presence is sufficient to convey profound sadness
and dissatisfaction at the prospect of her father’s remarriage. (We were also
prepared for this by a previous comment made by Noriko to Professor On-
odera [Masao Mishima], her father’s friend, to the effect that she found his
remarriage to be ‘distasteful,’ ‘indecent’ and even ‘filthy’.) This is a pivotal
moment because it marks the beginning of Noriko’s realisation of her father’s
separateness and with it the fact that he may have desires of his own, im-
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The Noh play 1
plying that his pursuit of happiness may not be essentially attached to hers.
Moreover, by the end of this sequence, Ozu has once again managed to simul-
taneously incite and undercut or destabilise our conventional expectations
concerning the behaviour of the main characters in this traditional setting.
This reinforces the message that some traditional practices are slowly being
emptied of their original force and purpose, at the verge of becoming mere
ritualised repetitions – or perhaps forms of mourning a world already felt as
lost.
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(vi) The collapse of Noriko and Somiya’s domestic world
The changes in Noriko’s behaviour evolve quickly after the last sequence: her
initial playfulness around the house recedes and is replaced by a degree of
stiffness; in the same vein, the general ease and fluidity of her interactions
with Somiya now subside, and a more distanced relationship takes place.
These changes, I would argue, mark the transition from Noriko’s belated
childhood or adolescence to adulthood and independence, which calls for a
work of mourning her lost self, as well as the domestic world previously shared
with her father. As a result, the prospect of her own marriage, which was
repeatedly encouraged by Somiya and more or less dismissed by Noriko up
to now, finally becomes a serious possibility in her mind. (This will be made
explicit later, when she visits Aya and shares some information about her
suitor, Satake, implying that she does not find him unattractive.) Concur-
rently with Noriko’s change, Ozu starts framing Somiya alone in the family
house and providing lingering shots of empty rooms and corridors, thus invit-
ing the viewer to share the father’s emerging feeling of emptiness now that
the prospect of Noriko leaving the house becomes a real possibility.
(vii) The trip to Kyoto
The work of mourning already in course gradually leads Noriko to admit the
possibility of pursuing a renewed, more mature identity. This change in her
outlook is perhaps the reason why Noriko and Somiya decide to go together
on a trip to Kyoto, where they will be able to enjoy their familial intimacy
one last time in a sort of farewell celebration – an important additional step
towards mourning their separation and the loss of their shared world. The
location chosen for this sequence is significant: as the former capital of Japan,
Kyoto – with its old temples, monuments, and rock gardens – stands for a
traditional Japanese way of life that is also being lost, as Ozu kept reminding
us throughout the film; therefore the whole sequence can be interpreted as
a farewell to that world, thus sedimenting the cinematic work of mourning
intimated in previous sequences. Noriko’s maturation is here underscored
by, among other factors, her avowed change of mind regarding Professor On-
odera’s remarriage: her regret in having previously expressed disgust towards
it shows that she is finally open to accepting human separateness, as well as
the fact that, for adult human beings, the pursuit of happiness is an ongoing
process that may take a lifetime, and that will inevitably involve coping with
loss. This point is also stressed in one important exchange between the two
protagonists, at the end of their last day together. Prompted by Somiya’s
remark that it was a pleasurable day but that from now it would be her new
husband, Satake, who would be responsible to ‘go places’ with her, Noriko
momentarily relapses into her earlier, more childish self, and replies:
I . . . want us to stay as we are. I don’t want to go anywhere. Being
with you is enough for me. I’m happy as I am. Even marriage
248
Jônadas Techio
The trip to Kyoto 1
The trip to Kyoto 2
249
Mourning the Loss of the Ordinary.
The trip to Kyoto 3
couldn’t make me happier. . . . You marry if you want to Father.
I just want to be by your side. I’m so fond of you. Being with you
like this is my greatest happiness. Please Father, why can’t we
stay just as we are? I know marriage won’t make me any happier.
To which Somiya retorts:
That’s not true. You’ll see. I’m 56 years old. My life is nearing its
end. But your life as a couple is just beginning. You’re starting
a new life, one that you and Satake must build together. One in
which I play no part. That’s the order of human life and history.
Marriage may not mean happiness from the start. To expect such
immediate happiness is a mistake. Happiness isn’t something you
wait around for. It’s something you create yourself.[...] Happiness
lies in the forging of a new life shared together. It may take a year
or two. Maybe even five or ten. Happiness comes only through
effort.
Moved by her father’s speech Noriko apologises ‘for being so selfish’, thus
triggering a crucial development in her path towards adulthood, which culmi-
nates in her finally acquiescing – this time wholeheartedly – to marry Satake.
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(viii) Noriko’s departure
The farewell will be carried out to its conclusion in the next short sequence,
which takes place back at the family home in Kamakura, just before the
wedding ceremony. We see Noriko in her room (now cleared of furniture),
beautifully dressed in a traditional Japanese wedding kimono, and holding
an ambiguous smile that seems to convey genuine contentment while also
trying to hide some (understandable) sadness at the prospect of leaving her
old home for good. Before heading to the wedding Noriko bows to her father
and expresses her gratitude for his ‘loving care these many years’. Somiya
smiles and urges her to ‘be happy and be a good wife.’ This is the last time
we see them together.
Noriko’s departure 1
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(ix) An epilogue: Somiya’s solitude, and the cycles of life
After the wedding (which, true to Ozu’s propensity for ellipses, happens off-
screen) we meet Somiya and Aya having drinks and chatting at a bar. Visibly
concerned, Aya asks whether Somiya will be well living alone. ‘I’ll soon get
used to it,’ he replies. Prompted by Aya’s remark to the effect that Noriko
was upset about his remarriage, Somiya confesses that he had never really
intended to remarry and that he had said so just to persuade Noriko to leave.
Aya, moved by Somiya’s sacrifice, promises to visit him often. Ozu then cuts
to Somiya’s entering his house and sitting on a chair that used to be upstairs,
and which we associate with Noriko. As Klevan has remarked, this simple
act of using one of Noriko’s chairs ‘both recalls her absence and conveys an
unfamiliar position for [Somiya]’, thus emphasising the challenge of learning
how to make himself at home anew, without Noriko’s help.43 The hardness
of this challenge is underscored by what has to be one of the most extraor-
dinary uses of an ordinary scene in the history of film: Ozu gives us a series
of close-ups of Somiya as he carefully peels an apple, trying – but ultimately
failing – to keep the peel in one piece; then, echoing Noriko’s subtle yet ex-
pressive lowering of the head at the Noh play (sequence v), Somiya lowers his
own head in what reads and feels like a moment of realisation, followed by
profound sadness and resignation. Again, Klevan offers a fine analysis of this
moment, claiming that ‘the film does not cut to the peel falling onto the floor
because it wishes to maintain the integrity of something lost from the frame
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and now unrecoverable’.44 We then cut to the final shot of the film, in which
we see the ocean waves crashing on the beach, suggesting a sort of cosmic
indifference towards the human plight as well as reminding us of the cyclic
character of life. The message is clear: as waves in the ocean, separation, and
loss will keep recurring as long as there is human life, and so will the need
for mourning and starting anew.
IV.
I hope the preceding analysis was sufficient to indicate Late Spring’s perva-
sive concern with the conditions and difficulties involved in the task of making
oneself at home in the world, especially when faced with the ascendancy of
a modern outlook. The film conveys that concern through a series of nested
cinematic disclosures whose cumulative effect is, as I suggested, congenial to
Cavell’s understanding of our condition under the threat of (modern) skep-
ticism. As he puts in the passage used as the epigraph to this essay, ‘[t]he
everyday is what we cannot but aspire to, since it appears to us as lost to
us’.45 In other words, for finite human beings, the everyday is always an
ideal, something towards which we must strive continuously, while contin-
uously mourning its loss. As I also suggested, Late Spring takes up these
issues in a way that is reminiscent of Cavell’s favourite Hollywood comedies
and melodramas, namely by focusing on the challenges affecting one emblem-
atic human relationship. As I bring this essay to a close I would like to present
one further outcome of this parallel, having to do with Ozu’s choice not to
show Noriko’s wedding ceremony.
At the end of the following passage, which contrasts film’s reinstatement
of the myth of marriage with classical comedy, Cavell introduces an intriguing
speculation which I think will be helpful in this connection:
In classical comedy the stage at the end is littered with marriages,
tangled pairs have at last been sorted out, age accepts its place,
youth takes its own, and families are present to celebrate the
continuance of their order. At some point, perhaps when the world
went to war, society stopped believing in its ability to provide that
continuity.46
As indicated above, Late Spring takes place during the immediate after-
math of World War II, and this ambivalence towards society’s ability to pro-
vide continuity seems to be precisely the feeling permeating the film.47 This,
I would argue, is also what motivates the film’s ambivalence towards the
changes it is documenting, particularly (but in no way exclusively) changes
affecting the institution of marriage. This point was made with characteristic
acuity by Klevan:
Refusing to polarise situations and characters, the film’s point of
view in relation to marriage is not orientated to one perspective
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or balanced between competing opinions, but rather suspended.
The film’s view-point rarely hardens into an adamant position:
it’s understanding of marriage gently vacillates, not because the
film itself is confused, but rather because it is clear about the
confusions and apprehensions which accompany life’s changes.48
In later writings, Cavell went on to explore the speculation I presented
above in much more detail. He did that in part by defining the genre of
‘remarriage comedies’ in contrast to (and as an inheritor of the preoccupations
of) Shakespearean romantic comedy. One specific feature of that contrast is
particularly relevant in this connection: while Shakespearean comedy shows a
young pair ‘overcoming individual and social obstacles to their happiness’, and
concludes with a wedding ceremony, the main drive of the plot of remarriage
comedies ‘is not to get the central pair together, but to get them back together,
together again’;49 as Cavell later puts it:
I have accounted for this compromise or subversion by saying var-
iously that this comedy expects the pair to find happiness alone,
unsponsored, in one another, out of their capacities for improvis-
ing a world, beyond ceremony. Now I add that this is not to be
understood exactly or merely as something true of modem society
but as something true about the conversation of marriage that
modem society comes to lay bare. The courage, the powers, re-
quired for happiness are not something a festival can reward, or
perhaps so much as recognise, any longer. Or rather, whatever
festival and ceremony can do has already been done. And wasn’t
this always true?50
If we keep in mind the correlation between ordinary/marriage and skep-
ticism/divorce established at the end of section II (item vii on that list),
this passage will acquire a new valence: it suggests not only that remarriage
comedies have laid bare something that has always been true about marriage
– namely that nothing external to the pair’s own powers can ensure its success
and persistence – but also, and more importantly, that modern skepticism has
laid bare something that has always been true about our condition – namely
that nothing external to our own powers (poor things) can ensure the success
and persistence of our connection with the world and others in it. This, it
seems to me, is another way of expressing what Cavell thinks is ‘the truth in
skepticism’. And I want to suggest, in closing, that Late Spring’s ambivalence
towards marriage, and particularly its choice not to show a wedding ceremony,
can be understood as Ozu’s own acknowledgment of this truth about human
relatedness and about human dwelling.
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NOTES
1Cavell 1981, 9.
2Cavell 1981, 10, 12.
3Cavell 1981, 10.
4Cavell 1984, 14.
5Cavell 1971, 43.
6Cavell 2004, 6.
7Cavell 2004, 6.
8Heidegger, an implicit presence in
what follows, would call this our ‘modern
understanding of being’ – see especially
the essays ‘The question concerning tech-
nology’ and ‘The age of the world picture’
in Heidegger 1997.
9Such as the signature low or ‘tatami’
shots, mostly stationary camera, sustained
focus on interiors, slow pace and, crucially,
repetition.
10Cavell 1987, 94.
11Although this is what skepticism has
been reduced to, especially in the analytic
epistemological tradition. I took up this
issue in Techio 2016.
12See Cavell 1987, 94-95.
13Cavell 1987, 3.
14See, e.g., Cavell 1976, 258, and Cavell
1979, 241 and 448.
15Cavell 1984, 192-193.
16Cavell 1988, 172.
17Cavell 1988, 172.
18Clewell 2004, Freud 1917.
19Clewell 2004, 77.
20Lear 2017 presents a congenial account
of the work of mourning. To my mind,
one of the best cinematic expressions of
this process is offered by Hiroshima Mon
Amour (Alain Resnais, 1959).
21Clewell 2004, 77.
22Cavell 1987, 11, 138.
23See, e.g., Wittgenstein 1984, 17.
24Cavell 1979, 236, 452.
25See Rugo 2016, 26.
26See Rugo 2016, 27-28.
27I explore this last topic in more detail
in Techio 2020.
28Cavell 1988, 174.
29See Cavell 1996, 9.
30Cavell 1988, 176.
31Cavell 1976, 118.
32Parks 2016, 284.
33As William Rothman has argued in an
essay to which I am much in debt, Late
Spring shares with remarriage comedies an
interest in the ’pursuit of happiness’, par-
ticularly as it is shown to require ‘embrac-
ing change, letting go of one’s old self in
order for a new self to be born’. Rothman
2006, 34.
34On this connection, compare again
Jonathan Lear 2018, 1207 fn 1: ‘For, we
are creatures who do not simply move
through a series of stages – infancy, youth,
adolescence, and adulthood. At each
stage, what it is to move on consists in
bidding adieu to earlier modes of relating
to parents and loved ones, and we main-
tain these earlier forms, perhaps somewhat
transformed, in memories, emotions, and
styles of being.’ My emphasis.
35I wish I could say more about what
Burch 1979 famously called Ozu’s ‘pillow-
shots’, namely shots of still lives, land-
scapes, and empty spaces commonly used
by him to mark a transition between se-
quences. Suffice it to say that I concur
with Parks evaluation that their role in
Late Spring is ‘to fill the film with a sense
of the degree to which life exceeds the nar-
rowly human horizons in which it appears
to us in our everyday lives’ (Parks 2016,
300-301). It is worth noting that Late
Spring begins and ends with such shots
(more on the closing pillow-shot below,
sequence ix), which is another indication
that the film wants us to consider the lives
at its center both from a human and from
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a cosmic perspective.
36A portable brazier used to heat the
water kettle to make tea.
37It might be useful to recall that the
film takes place in 1949, hence during US
occupation and only one year after the
promulgation of Japan’s new Constitution,
which introduces deep political and social
changes.
38This impression is reinforced through-
out the movie by, among other things,
advertisement of American products, two
prominent examples being a large ‘Time-
Life’ sign seen in Tokyo and the ‘Drink
Coca-Cola’ sign seen during Noriko and
Hattori’s bicycle ride.
39This initial impression will be rein-
forced by two later sequences in which we
see the Westernised architecture and dec-
oration of Aya’s house – including a fire-
place, sofas, upholstered chairs, Western
paintings, magazines in English, and so on.
40Klevan 2000, 142.
41As Klevan has argued, Late Spring’s
‘undramatic style [...] is ideal for render-
ing a reticent form of family interaction’
in which deep emotions are, for the most
part, left unexpressed, or at the very least
underexpressed (Klevan 2000, 135).
42This information was revealed by aunt
Masa during an earlier exchange, leaving
Noriko quite upset.
43Klevan 2000, 146.
44Klevan 2000, 159.
45Cavell 1988, 171.
46Cavell 1971, 79; my emphasis.
47See note 37.
48Klevan 2000, 136.
49Cavell 1981, 1, 2.
50Cavell 1981, 239.
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